Glassnode Flags 1.92M BTC Quantum-Exposed as France Sets 2027 Post-Crypto-Encryption Deadline
In today’s Bitcoin news, France’s cybersecurity authority ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) announced at the France Quantum conference that it will stop certifying security systems without quantum-resistant encryption beginning in 2027. A full transition is scheduled for 2030, covering government agencies and critical infrastructure operators. The announcement lands alongside Glassnode’s May 2026 report, which estimates that 6.04 million BTC—around 30.2% of total supply—has publicly visible keys recorded on-chain.
The development goes beyond routine regulatory tightening. It reflects one of the most concrete national timelines yet for moving away from classical cryptographic standards, emerging as Bitcoin researchers increasingly quantify the network’s potential exposure to future quantum computing advances.
Glassnode’s Breakdown of Quantum Exposure
Glassnode divides the exposed Bitcoin supply into two categories. The first is 1.92 million BTC (roughly 9.6%), labeled structurally exposed. These are coins where public keys are inherently revealed, including early P2PK outputs, legacy multisig structures, and Taproot (P2TR) formats.
The second is 4.12 million BTC (about 20.6%), classified as operationally exposed. This category includes coins that became vulnerable through address reuse, partial spending behavior, or custodial practices that exposed public keys.
The report stresses that modern wallet behavior contributes more to exposure than older dormant coins. Centralized exchanges are estimated to hold around 1.63–1.66 million BTC within the operational exposure category. By contrast, sovereign holdings from the U.S., U.K., and El Salvador reportedly show no quantum exposure due to the use of non-revealing address types. The remaining 13.99 million BTC (approximately 69.8%) is considered unexposed under Glassnode’s model.
The underlying concern is Bitcoin’s reliance on ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) over the secp256k1 curve. In theory, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could derive private keys from exposed public keys, placing those funds at risk once a so-called “Q-Day” arrives. Outputs that only reveal hashed public keys, such as P2PKH, remain protected until spent.
France’s Quantum Migration Timeline
Speaking at the conference, ANSSI Chief of Staff Samih Souissi described the shift to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a strategic issue spanning governance, regulation, and sovereignty—not just technical upgrades.
The agency’s roadmap requires organizations to inventory sensitive systems by the end of 2026, map dependencies by the end of 2027, and complete full PQC migration by 2030.
This timeline aligns with broader global expectations. Google has set an internal target of 2029 for PQC migration, while quantum security firm Project Eleven estimates a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could emerge around 2030.
NIST has also outlined plans to phase out classical public-key cryptography, including RSA and ECC, by roughly 2030–2035, with major technology providers already integrating these timelines into infrastructure planning.
Academic work presented at DEF CON 33 suggests that as few as 1,754 logical qubits could theoretically threaten secp256k1 under optimistic assumptions, though most experts still place realistic risk farther out over the next 10–20 years.
Earlier research varies widely in estimates. Deloitte has suggested up to 4 million BTC may be exposed under broader definitions, while Chaincode Labs places the figure between 4 million and 10 million BTC. Glassnode’s 6.04 million estimate sits within this range but applies narrower classification criteria.
